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14 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Subject: Intelligence Support for Long-Term Planning US
Force Requirements

1. Attached is a detailed discussion of an approach to the problem of providing intelligence support for long-term planning of US force requirements. In essence it suggests the formation of a small, integrated group (6), responsible directly to the Director, Central Intelligence. Defense Intelligence Agency would furnish three military members. Central Intelligence Agency would provide an economist, a scientist, and the chairman. The mission of this group would be to establish, and to keep current, several alternative Soviet force postures as they might be five years in the future. Major points of departure would be established by relevant NIE's. Annually, the Director, Central Intelligence, after US Intelligence Board review, would forward to the Secretary of Defense a report embodying these intelligence assumptions.

2. The proposal has not been discussed with members of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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PROPOSED APPROACH TO PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT FOR LONG-TERM PLANNING OF US FORCE REQUIREMENTS

1. The Department of Defense has instituted on an annual basis programming of US force requirements over a five-year period. At the present time this is being accomplished without a comparable detailed, integrated analysis of the Sino-Soviet forces--the enemy against which US weapon systems must be superior. It appears essential that the intelligence community should fill the need, even though the period of time is beyond that which can be estimated with confidence.

2. It is, therefore, proposed that the intelligence community develop, on an annual basis, a series of assumed Soviet force postures projected five years into the future. The number of alternatives cannot be determined in advance, but until further experience is gained it is proposed that four should be developed. In all cases, the relevant National Intelligence Estimate would be the point of departure. Within each force structure, the weapon systems should be grouped in "packages," i.e., central war offensive, central war defensive, etc., to conform to those being used by the Department of Defense. As part of the exercise, the alternative force structures would be costed. This would not only permit some rough comparisons with the US

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future programming but would also provide a vehicle for further exploration of the value of this technique to estimating future Soviet force goals. Efforts would be made to develop assumptions as to research and development which would appear logical given the particular composition of an alternative force structure.

3. To provide some range to the possible threat, the force structures would be based not only on the strategic concepts given in the NIE, but also on others which appeared to be logical. The weapons system included would be analyzed in terms of tactical employment, and also of target systems against which they could most effectively be employed. Variations in the strategic force structures for example, might result from the inclusion or exclusion of an anti-ballistic missile system, hardened missile sites, large-yield warheads, advanced bombers, a change in the US posture, etc. In the case of ground forces, tactical air, and non-strategic naval forces, variations might result from changes in weapon systems, or in strategic posture. It is anticipated that in time the alternative structures projected into the future could be fitted to a basis projecting five years into the past, and thus provide perhaps a more sound basis for judging the range of assumptions chosen. In producing the above data, it is anticipated that there will

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be concepts and hypotheses developed which should be of value to intelligence officers engaged in current and estimates work, and, perhaps on occasion, in the collection field.

4. In time, it is possible that the maintenance, on a continuing and detailed basis, of several possible Soviet force postures, would permit National Intelligence Estimates to minimize detailed military estimating and to look into the future only as far as would seem possible with high confidence. For example, in estimating the future of the Soviet missile submarine force, the NIE could describe it in general terms, give numbers perhaps up to two years in the future, and then discuss in general terms anticipated developments further in the future. The group could be responsible for fitting this material into the several possible force structures, and develop detailed characteristics based both on the estimate and on the possible use to which the submarine force might be placed. A sharper division between that which can be estimated with confidence and that which it is better to present with alternative assumptions should strengthen the position of the NIE.

5. The most important consumers of the above analysis would be the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the planning staffs of individual Services and unified

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and specified commands, responsible for developing proposals as to objective forces; various war gaming units; and the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. General use of a common range of data has the advantage of providing some basis for comparison of results of gaming or of the cost effectiveness of competing future weapon systems.

6. It is proposed that the production of the Sino-Soviet force projections be accomplished by a small, integrated staff, responsible directly to the Director, Central Intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Agency would provide three military officers, one from each Service, in the grade of Colonel or Captain. The senior rank is necessary to insure that collectively they represent a wide range of experience and have knowledge of and an entree to sources of information within their own Services. The Central Intelligence Agency would provide one economist and one scientist, and the chairman, the latter from the Office of National Estimates. To maintain continuity, no more than one military and one civilian should be replaced in any one year (thus three-year tours are required). It is also suggested that the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee; the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee; the Director, Intelligence, the Joint Staff; National Security Agency; and the Department of State each designate a liaison officer through whom

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the group could acquire information and discuss tentative approaches to particular problems.

7. It is believed essential that the group must have "need to know" clearances for US future force development as well as access to all sources of intelligence materials. The limited number in the group and its relative isolation bureaucratically should assist in acceptance of the latter point. The group should be located in the CIA building at Langley.

8. The recommendation that the group be responsible directly to the Director, Central Intelligence rather than to the Defense Intelligence Agency or to the United States Intelligence Board, is based on several considerations. Even though the product is primarily for military consumption, on the basis of the planned capability of DIA, its production will require contribution of resources from most members of the intelligence community, especially CIA. A group within the DIA would have a greater problem tapping these resources than one operating from the center of the community. The main consideration against placing the group subordinate to USIB is the desired relationship between members of the group and their home organizations. Based on the experience of the NESG, which has dealt with a similar problem, it was apparent that a freer exchange of views and ideas occur and a more cohesive, effective

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working body can be achieved if members are integrated rather than representatives of their services. This observation would indicate that the representatives should formally be separated from their individual Services, a separation which would not be achieved if the group were responsible to USIB.

9. The principal product of this group would be an annual report which would present alternative Soviet force structures for a period five years in the future in table form and in the Department of Defense "force packaging" format. The report would also contain analyses of the apparent threat posed by each of these several force postures. The timing of the annual report would be established by the budget cycle of the Department of Defense.

10. It is proposed that the annual report be reviewed by the US Intelligence Board after consideration by the Board of National Estimates and USIB representatives. It is believed that the problems of coordinating a fairly detailed report should be minimized as a result of continuing contact between the group and the several intelligence organizations. Furthermore, the foundation of the report will be approved NIE's and the evolution of the alternative force structures will be followed and commented upon through the circulation of working papers.

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11. It is proposed that the group should have permission to circulate working papers through which hypotheses could be tested and ideas and comments sought. By this device, major pieces of the final report would have been generally reviewed prior to the formal action on the whole. It is contemplated that these papers would be circulated not only within the intelligence community but also to groups responsible for war gaming and future programming.

12. With regard to the impact of this proposed approach on CIA internally, it is apparent that there would be some additional demands placed on ONE, ORR, and OSI. If ONE provided the chairman as suggested, a replacement would be required. On the other hand, it seems likely that some of the pressure on the existing ONE military staff would be reduced for the reasons discussed above. Moreover, it should be noted that the group would be available to assist the Board of National Estimates in their considerations of problems relating to Sino-Soviet military forces, and in this manner would further aid the ONE military staff.

13. ORR would be required to furnish a senior economist. It also seems likely that ORR would have to strengthen its financial staff to support the group in costing the Soviet

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force packages. ORR might also require some additional strength if it were decided to include economic target projection.

14. OSI would be required to furnish a senior scientist. In addition, some form of coordination of effort within OSI probably would be required to provide support to the OSI member of the group.

15. It should be emphasized that the provision of intelligence support for future planning of the nature sought by DOD is a new requirement and its full implications are yet to be determined. Thus, it is recommended that the above described operation be established on a tentative basis and that the problem formally be reviewed after the submission of the first full annual report (in the late spring or early summer of 1963).



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